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Abrahams: People v. Sandoval

PEOPLE V. SANDOVAL
CRIMINAL LAW- Cross-examination of defendant for impeachment-trialjudge may give defendant prospective ruling limiting
prosecutor'sreference, in cross-examinationimpeachment of defendant, to prior specific criminal, vicious and immoral acts. 34
N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).

Due to a recent ruling by the New York Court of Appeals in
People v. Sandoval,' an ex-offender facing criminal charges has
a better chance of receiving a fair trial. The court established a
firm policy of encouraging pre-trial hearings to limit the prosecution's freedom to impeach a defendant's credibility through crossexamination concerning his "prior specific criminal, vicious or
immoral acts."' 2 Additionally, the court established a frame of
reference within which trial courts should exercise discretion in
determining what evidence of misbehavior should be admitted for
the sake of impeaching credibility.' A defendant's decision to
testify or not is thus made on a more informed basis.
In New York, the prosecutor had always been permitted to
introduce evidence of prior crimes if he was trying in good faith
to establish a defendant's lack of credibility.' Theoretically, the
admission of such evidence was subject to the discretion of the
trial judge.- In practice, the long-standing precedent was to permit the pro forma introduction of all crimes except traffic offenses.' This precedent was altered in April of 1974, when the Second
1. 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974).
2. Id. at 373, 314 N.E.2d at 415, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852. While the language of the court
and of this note is primarily addressed to prior convictions, prior vicious or immoral acts
are subject to the same restraints on admissibility. See also People v. Duffy, 44 App.
Div.2d 298, 306, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672, 679-80 (2d Dep't. 1974).
3. Before Sandoval, restraints were placed on the cross-examination of defendants for
reasons other than credibility. See People v. Moore, 20 App. Div.2d 817, 248 N.Y.S.2d 739,
740-41 (2d Dep't. 1964) (evidence of prior crimes not admissible to show propensity or
predisposition for commission of crime for which a defendant is being tried). See also
People v. Zackowitz, 254 N.Y.192, 172 N.E. 466 (1930) (district attorney may not probe
too far into details of prior crime in an effort to paint a picture of professional criminality).
However, on cross-examination or on direct, the prosecutor retains the right to introduce
evidence of prior specific criminal acts. See N.Y. CRIM. Pno. L. §60.40 (3) (McKinney
1971) (prior crimes evidence admissible to establish element of the crime). See also N.Y.
CRIn. PRO. L. §60.40 (2) (McKinney 1971) (prior crimes evidence admissible to rebut
character evidence introduced by a defendant).
4. People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200, 93 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1950).
5. Id. at 201-02, 93 N.E.2d at 639. See also People v. Webster, 139 N.Y. 73, 84 (1893).
6. People v. Duffy, 44 App. Div.2d 298, 301, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674 (2d Dep't. 1974).
See N.Y. C0am. PRo. L. §60.40 (McKinney 1971). This statute, first enacted in 1967, allows
the proper introduction of prior crimes evidence. The court in Sandoval seeks to define
what is meant by "proper".
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Department of New York's Appellate Division handed down a
decision which is strikingly similar to Sandoval. Judge Shapiro,
in People v. Duffy, ruled:'
On appropriate application, made either at or prior to trial, and
in the exercise of sound discretion, the trial court should determine whether an applying defendant has sustained the burden,
which should be his of demonstrating that the prejudice involved in permitting into evidence prior convictions or criminal
acts so far outweighs the probative value of such proof for impeachment purposes that the proof should not be received.
However, the impact of Duffy was muted by the forceful ruling
of the state's highest court in Sandoval, which was decided only
8
two months later.
Augustin Sandoval was indicted for common law murder.
Prior to jury selection, on a motion by Sandoval, the trial court
ruled that the district attorney could not use a 1960 charge of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a 1965 arrest for felonious assault which resulted in dismissal, a 1967 charge of gambling, 1963 and 1965 convictions for driving while intoxicated,
and a 1965 traffic violation to impeach his credibility.' However,
the court found that a 1964 disorderly conduct conviction and a
1965 third-degree assault conviction were admissible to impeach
the defendant's credibility should he choose to testify."0 The defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial in that the trial
court should have ruled all prior convictions inadmissible."1
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and in so
doing commented extensively on and endorsed "the procedure
made available to defendant in this case to obtain a prospective
ruling limiting the prosecutor's reference, in cross-examination
impeachment of defendant, to prior specific criminal, vicious and
'1 2
immoral acts.
By thus encouraging a pre-trial ruling on this issue, Sandoval
"reflects a recognition of the principles underlying broadened dis7. People v. Duffy, 44 App. Div.2d 298, 305, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672, 678 (2d Dep't. 1974).
8. The Duffy opinion did not delve into the question of drug offenses, as did
Sandoval. See note 18 infra and accompanying text. Nor did the Duffy court expressly
select the pre-trial motion as the vehicle for limiting the prosecution's cross-examination.
9. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 373, 314 N.E.2d 413, 415, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849,
852 (1974).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 372, 314 N.E.2d at 415, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
12. Id. at 373, 314 N.E.2d at 415, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
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covery in criminal procedure."' 3 Further, noting that "there may
be undue prejudice to a defendant from unnecessary and immaterial development of previous misconduct,"' 4 the court established an illustrative frame of reference for a trial court to consider in determining the limits of the district attorney's crossexamination. For example, the court cited crimes of impulsive
violence, or crimes caused by addiction, traffic offenses, and acts
remote in time as offenses which "seldom have any logical bearing on the defendant's credibility, veracity or honesty at the time
of trial.' 5 Conversely, the court noted:'"
To the extent . . . that the prior commission of a particular
crime of calculated violence or of specified vicious or immoral
acts significantly revealed a willingness or disposition on the
part of the particular defendant voluntarily to place the advancement of his individual self-interest ahead of principle or
of the interests of society, proof thereof may be relevant to suggest his readiness to do so again on the witness stand.
Thus the commission of crimes such as perjury, bribery, or acts
of deceit will generally have great relevance to the issue of a
defendant's credibility, no matter when they were committed.' 7
Additionally, the court noted that even the most forceful
limiting instruction may be inadequate to prevent the highly prejudicial effect of introducing evidence that a defendant has in the
past committed the same crime with which he is presently
charged. In a most significant example, the court observed: 8
[I]n the prosecution of drug charges, interrogation as to prior
narcotics convictions (unless proof thereof is independently
admissible) may present a special risk of impermissible prejudice because of the widely accepted belief that persons convicted of narcotics offenses are likely to be habitual offenders.
13. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 376-77, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855-56.
16. Id. at 377, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
17. See People v. Mallard, 172 N.Y.L.J. 30, August 19, 1974, at 13, col. 8(Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1974). In a lengthy response to a Sandoval-type pre-trial motion, Judge
Finz ruled that the only prior crimes evidence his court will admit to impeach credibility
are "perjury, fraud and deceit, larceny by misrepresentation and other closely related
crimes which have at their very core the prior dishonest or untruthful quality of the
defendant." Id. at 14, col. 3.
18. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 377-78, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d
849, 856 (1974), citing United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1971). Contra,
Durant v. United States, 292 A.2d 157, 161 (D.C. App. 1972).
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However, the court noted that if a defendant is charged with a
crime of individual dishonesty, such as perjury, a prior conviction
of the same offense should be admitted because of its direct bearing on the defendant-witness' veracity. 9
Background
At common law prior to the nineteenth century, the ex-felon
was not permitted to testify before any court.20 The rationale
behind this harsh rule that since felonies were generally punishable by death, one unworthy of life itself was unworth to testify
in court. 2' A similar disability was incurred by one convicted of
treason, forgery or most crimes of dishonesty.2 2 This rule was
abrogated during the nineteenth century, and replaced by a more
liberal principle - the ex-offender was allowed to testify, but the
all prior convictions
prosecutor could introduce into evidence
3
2
which had bearing on his character.

It is extremely difficult to articulate a general rule for the
United States, 24 for control of the introduction of prior crimes
evidence remains in the domain of each state: 25 the result is a
diversity of approaches. The various states' rules have rarely been
found to violate a defendant's federal constitutional rights,2 6 and
there has been no definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. A
majority of state courts, however, follow the general principle
that a defendant in a criminal case may be impeached in the
same manner as any other witness.27 Thus a defendant with a
prior criminal record faces two dangerous alternatives at trial. If
he testifies, the prosecution will recite his past misdeeds, ostensibly in a good-faith effort to impeach his credibility. Such evidence tends to convince a jury of a defendant's bad character or
criminal personality, factors which needless to say, are highly
19. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
20. 1 S. GRmEENLEF, EVIDENCE § §372-73 (16th ed. 1899).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, §§1-7 (1898). See also An Act to
Amend the Law of Evidence, 6 & 7 Vict., c.85 at 551-52 (1843).
24. In England, use of prior crimes evidence is generally restricted to rebuttal of a
defendant's introduction of evidence of his good character, or of the bad character of the
prosecution witnesses. See 1 J. WmMoE, EVIDENCE §194a (3d ed. 1940).
25. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
26. See State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) (where the admission
of priqr crimes evidence was held to be a violation of the defendant's right to due process).
See also Note, Admission of Prior Conviction to Impeach Defendant-Witness Violates

ConstitutionalRight to Due Process, 25 VAD. L. REv. 918 (1972).
27. IIIA J. WIoMoRE, EVIDENCE §890 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
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prejudicial.2s If he fails to testify, he faces the adverse inference
2
by the jury that he has something to hide. 1
Courts often try to alleviate this problem through the use of
limiting instructions. If a defendant's prior record has been introduced, the court may warn the jury to consider that record only
so far as it reflects upon the defendant's credibility as a witness."
If a defendant fails to testify, courts must prevent the prosecution
from commenting upon that failure, 3 and may instruct the jury
that they are to draw no inference from his non-appearance. The
effectiveness of limiting instructions was once noted by Mr. Justice Jackson, who said: "The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury. . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.""2
In recent years, numerous attempts have been made by state
courts and legislatures to reconcile the prejudice to criminal defendants caused by the introduction of prior crimes evidence with
the interest of the state in informing the jury of a defendant's
prior inclination to lie.? These attempts can be roughly divided
into two categories: those which afford little discretion to the trial
court, and those like Sandoval, which do. In the former category
are those jurisdictions which only allow the introduction of prior
felonies, 34 or of prior felonies and misdemeanors.3 5 Such rules do
not permit the trial court to consider the extreme prejudice to the
defendant caused by the introduction of certain prior crimes evidence, and have little to commend them except their ease of
3
application. 1
28. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMEmcAN JuRY 127-30, 160-62, 179-81 (1966). See
also Broeder, The U. of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959).
29. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 215, 221-22 (1968).
30. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 63 Cal.2d 779, 791, 409 P.2d 222, 230, 48 Cal. Rptr.
382, 390 (1966) ("You must not use this evidence in determining the defendant's guilt or
innocence of the other charges, nor must you permit yourself to be influenced against the
defendant because he may have suffered a prior felony conviction.").
31. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,615 (1965). The fact that prosecutors may no
longer comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand makes the choice not to testify
a less onerous one. This lends some support to allowing the introduction of prior crimes
evidence.
32. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949) (concurring opinion).
33. See Note, An Eclectic Approach to Impeachment by Prior Convictions, 5 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 3 (1972).
34. See, e.g., IDAHo I.C. 9-1209 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. §622.17 (1950); UTAH CODE
ANN.§78-24-9 (1953).
35. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.§9-17-15 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §5.060.040
(1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.ch. 233, §21 (1959).
36. C. McCoRmcK, EvmENcE 85 (2d ed. 1972).
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A somewhat more flexible approach is taken by those states
which permit the introduction of all felonies, but only those misdemeanors which reflect on the defendant's honesty." In these
jurisdictions, the defendant is spared the introduction of minor
impulsive crimes, such as those relating to fighting or drunkenness.
Another refinement is the application of a remoteness-intime standard to the prior conviction. This protects the defendant
who has led a blameless life for a long period following his last
conviction."8
Perhaps the most restrictive rule of all is rule 21 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence.39 Under this formulation, the trial
court has no discretion to allow the introduction of prior crimes
evidence to impeach a defendant-witness' credibility unless the
defendant has introduced independent evidence solely for the
purpose of supporting his credibility. This theory runs counter to
the traditional feeling that one who takes the witness stand puts
his credibility at issue," and would permit an accomplished, convicted perjurer to testify and to receive the same credibility as
any other witness.
Sandoval emerged from the line of precedent which began
with Luck v. United States.41 The "Luck doctrine," as followed
and amplified by Gordon v. United States, 42 states that trial
courts should be granted wide discretion to consider the special
circumstances of a defendant's prior convictions when determining their admissibility to impeach his credibility. A court with
such discretion can balance the interest of the prosecution with
the possibility of dangerous prejudice to the defendant by considering such special factors as the following:
a. The age and circumstances of the defendant at the time
of the prior offense. 3
37. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 482 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1973); ALA. CODE tit. 7,
§434 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §381 (Supp. 1973).
38. See, e.g., ProposedFederalRules of Evidence 609(B), 56 F.R.D. 269(1972) ("Evi-

dence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years
has elapsed since the date of the release of the witness from confinement imposed for his
most recent conviction, or the expiration of the period of his parole, probation, or sentence

granted or imposed with respect to his most recent conviction, whichever is the later
date.").
39. UNIFoiM RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 21 (1953). Comparethe English rule discussed in note
24 supra, with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §711 (1964).
40. See, e.g., State v. Gervais, - Me. -, 317 A.2d 796 (1974).
41. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
42. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
43. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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b. Did the defendant "come clean" and plead guilty to the
earlier offense, or, using an alibi defense, was he tried and found
guilty? The latter would constitute a prima facie showing of the
defendant's prior dishonesty."
c. Is the evidence the defendant may testify to of such import to the finder of fact that the defendant's silence would hamper the search for the facts?45
d. Will the introduction into evidence of a prior conviction
for the same offense presently charged so prejudice the jury as to
make a fair trial impossible?"
Clearly, the Sandoval decision indicates that New York has
joined those states which subscribe to the Luck doctrine.47 But
lest this be construed as a nationwide trend, it must be noted that
some jurisdictions have expressly rejected the Luck doctrine,48
and both Luck and Gordonwere overruled by statute in their own
jurisdiction.49
44. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
45. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46. Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
47. See, e.g., People v. Beagle, 6 Cal.3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis.
2d 699, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,
228 A.2d 682 (1967).
49. The Luck and Gordon decisions were based largely on interpretation of a permissive statute, D.C.C.E. §14-305 (1966), as enacted in 1965, which read: "The fact of convic"
tion may be given in evidence to affect his [the witness'] credibility as a witness ....
(emphasis added). Noting the use of the word "may," the Luck court determined that
"[t]he statute, in our view, leaves room for the operation of a sound judicial discretion
to play upon the circumstances as they unfold in a particular case." Luck v. United States,
348 F.2d 763, 768 (1965).
Five years later, the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
was presented to the House of Representatives. It contained the following discussion,
which may have led to the statutory change which ultimately negatived Luck:
[Tihe Luck rule has proved absolutely unworkable. Because the local United
States Court of Appeals has been unable to provide meaningful, practicable
criteria to guide the trial judge's exercise of discretion, the latter's application
of the rule is chaotic. Some judges allow no impeachment at all. Those who do
frequently vary from case to case without rhyme or reason. Absence of meaningful criteria encourages appellate litigation because a convicted defendant can
always claim an abuse of discretion if impeachment has been allowed. ...
Because the Luck rule is unworkable, because it frustrates the search for truth
by excluding highly probative evidence, because it is inconsistent with the practise in the vast majority of other jurisdictions, your Committee has rejected the
rule in favor of the eminently sound and fair rule proposed by the prestigious
Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference. H.R. Rep. No.91-907, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess.63(1970).
In 1971, the Congress amended D.C.C.E. 14-305, adopting a rule basically the same
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Conclusion
The credibility of a criminal defendant who testifies in his
own behalf is lessened by the common experience of those who
judge him. Jurors must inevitably be aware that an individual
whose liberty is at stake may be willing to lie." This credibility
gap is widened by the traditional cross-examination of the exoffender which often consists of a pro forma recitation of his "rap
sheet" and little else.51 In choosing a Luck-type rule for New
York, the Court of Appeals has granted trial courts the broad
discretion to narrow the credibility gap and grant ex-offender
defendants their right to a fair trial.
For the defendant, the impact of Sandoval will go far beyond
merely guaranteeing a fair trial by giving him greater leverage in
plea bargaining. For example, prior to Sandoval, a prosecutor
with a relatively weak narcotics case had an extremely strong
52
position against a defendant with a lengthy narcotics record.
Now, the deal a prosecutor offers must be tempered by the knowledge that the jury may never see the defendant's prior record.
This fact may encourage a greater number of defendants to go to
trial. 3
as that suggested in 46 F.R.D. 161, 295 (1969), by the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence to the Committee on Rules of Practise and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States. The present statute mandates the introduction of all prior felonies
and many misdemeanors:
[F]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a criminal offense shall be admitted if offered,
either upon the cross-examination of the witness, or by evidence aliunde, but
only if the criminal offense (A) was punishable by death or imprisonment in
excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or (B) involved
dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment).
D.C.C.E. 14-305(b)(1) (Supp. V, 1972) (emphasis added).
An unsuccessful challenge to the amended statute was attempted in Dixon v. United
States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1972). That court rejected Dixon's argument that his prior
record was erroneously introduced, on the ground that Luck was expressly overruled by
the 1971 Amendment. Id. at 95-96. Further, the court dismissed Dixon's claim of denial
of due process of law and trial by impartial jury, finding that there was no violation of
the defendant's constitutional rights in the admission of his prior conviction for petit
larceny, in that the evidence was tempered by proper limiting instructions. Id. at 96. See
Note, Dixon v. United States: Prior Conviction Evidence and the Demise of the Luck
Rule, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 67 (1972). See also Davis v. United States, 313 A.2d 884 (D.C.
App. 1974).
50. Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
51. See, e.g., People v. Osteen, 46 Mich. App. 409, 208 N.W.2d 198 (1973).
52. United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1971).
53. The author discussed the Sandoval ruling with several criminal lawyers in Nassau
County, New York. They all believe it is encouraging a greater number of defendants to
go to trial rather than accept pleas. See also Note, Admission of PriorConviction to
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There are two aspects to Sandoval which may prove particularly troublesome. The first is procedural: in order for a defendant
to receive a Sandoval-type hearing, he must "inform the court of
the prior convictions and misconduct which might unfairly affect
him as a witness in his own behalf."5 4 Convictions are a matter
of public record, but must a defendant inform the authorities of
"misconduct" which could result in investigation and arrest?
While it is unlikely that the court meant to abridge a defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination, there is no indication in
Sandoval that the prosecution must put forward the prior misconduct which it intends to use. Hopefully, trial courts will interpret Sandoval to mean that the prosecution must come forward
with evidence of prior misconduct it intends to use, consistent
with "the principles underlying broadened discovery in criminal
' 55
procedure.
The second problematical aspect of Sandoval is the absence
of any constitutional basis for the decision. The Court of Appeals
suggested that, when determining the admissibility of prior
crimes evidence, the courts should follow the policy of placing the
burden on the defendant to prove that the probative value of the
evidence is far outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Sandoval
nowhere directly mentions the sixth amendment concept of trial
by imlartial jury. Nor does the court hold that the improper
admission of prior crimes evidence is a violation of a defendant's
constitutional right to testify in his own defense. Without a
constitutional basis, Sandoval does not rest on firm ground. If it
results in adding trials to New York's rapidly increasing trial
calendar,5" or should Sandoval-type pre-trial hearings significantly delay that calendar, the combined ire of judges and prosecutors could result in the overruling of Sandoval by legislative
fiat. One must look no further than the demise of the seminal
Impeach Defendant-Witness Violates ConstitutionalRight to Due Process, 25 VAND, L.
REv. 918, 923-24 (1972).

54. People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 378, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849,
856 (1974).
55. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 418, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
56. Id. at 378, 314 N.E.2d at 417, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 856; accord, People v. Duffy, 44
App. Div.2d 298, 305, 354 N.Y.S.2d 672, 678 (2d Dep't. 1974).
57. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273. See also State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 258,
492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971).
58. The stiff, mandatory penalties of New York's new drug law, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§220 (McKinney Supp. 1974), have resulted in less plea-bargaining and a greater number
of trials. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1974, at 28, col. 1.
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Luck and Gordon rulings in their own jurisdiction to recognize
this possibility. 9
Robert M. Abrahams
59. Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89 (D.C. App. 1972).
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